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The Future of Human Nature 
BY JÜRGEN HABERMAS 
Oxford: Polity Press, 2003. viii + 127 pp. £40.00 cloth, £13.99 paper 
 
This book comprises three lectures delivered by Habermas over the past three years. The 
collection forms another contribution to his ongoing engagement with Rawls and the political 
liberalism which Rawls represents. It also constitutes an important contribution to reflection 
on the future of ethics, especially in light of developments in genetic science. In the first 
lecture, entitled ‘Are there postmetaphysical answers to the question: what is the good life?’, 
Habermas describes the post-Rawlsian separation of moral theory from ethics that his book 
addresses. (It is well known that Habermas sees greater differences between himself and 
Rawls than Rawls does between himself and Habermas.) He wishes to develop a theory 
accounting for the motivation to act morally that is not dependent for its validity on 
‘normatively laden facts’ about the cosmos, human nature and history. One possibility is that 
questions of justice and morality may continue to draw responses from Kant and subsequent 
deontology. Another employs the Kiekegaardian ethical concept of ‘being oneself’, which 
Kierkegaard thought engendered a form of despair from which only a transition to the 
religious sphere could free the individual. Habermas subjects this transition to a ‘linguistic 
turn’ which ‘permits a deflationary interpretation of the “wholly other”’. Put more simply, 
many people now conceive of God as immanent within the world and a product of language, 
rather than as transcendent. Faith in this type of God will not, however, provide the individual 
with the same possibility of transcending despair. The ethics of ‘being oneself’ now becomes 
the final end, based on choice, rather than an intermediate one. Moreover, genetic science 
now provides the real possibility that what ‘being oneself’ means will become the object of 
societal production rather than subjective, personal self-realisation. 
 The second and principal essay, ‘The debate on the ethical self-understanding of the 
species’, considers how moral decisions about human nature might be made in circumstances 
in which human nature can be formed by human choices. Habermas believes that humanity 
has almost reached this point: ‘If we consider that medical mavericks are already busy 
working on the reproductive cloning of human organisms, we cannot help but feel that the 
human species might soon be able to take its biological evolution into its own hands.’ (p. 21) 
Some might argue that humanity is already beginning to do this. If either is the case, then the 
classical order of a shared conception of human nature generating an ethic which 
epistemologically grounds a moral framework and motivates adherence to it is no longer 
valid. Our existing moral self-understanding, based on a view of human nature as essentially 
unchanging and unchangeable, can no longer be preserved. What is needed to replace it is 
autonomous moral action grounded in the reflection of humanity on what it wishes to become. 
A realm of contingency has subsumed at least part of what was Kant’s kingdom of necessity, 
and any attempt simply to prevent change is now bound to fail. The Kantian association of 
morality with freedom (or its loss) becomes, in fact, even more pertinent in the contemporary 
world, and offers both a blessing and a curse. Habermas describes ‘the feeling of vertigo that 
seizes us when the ground beneath our feet, which we believed to be solid, begins to slip’. (p. 
39) 
 Habermas proceeds to show that what is needed to underpin this ground is a renewed 
understanding of the fusion of nature and soul – both in particular persons, and humanity as a 
whole – that will withstand the objectifying tendency of genetic manipulation and generate, in 
response, a principle of respect for transformable nature. Failure to recognise this could bring 
about a new human servitude to nature on the cusp of modernity’s domination of it. In 
practice, what is at risk is the communicative mode of character formation such as may take 
place in family, school and wider society. Opposed to it are preferences given to the ‘person’, 
if he or she can still be called this, which estrange her from ‘her’ body such that she becomes 
the mere observer of it. If birth were to become the end-point in a production process 
determined by public policy and private choice, rather than a stage in natural growth, there 
would be the danger of a dissonance of intention, instead of the gradual appropriating of 
intention that occurs during socialisation. In other words, human beings would be likely to 
resent the choices about their nature made by others before their birth, rather than by 
themselves as they grow up. Habermas describes this as a new paternalism of essence far 
deeper that the traditional paternalism of existence, daily living and material support. He 
states: ‘What is at stake, therefore, with the instrumentalisation of prepersonal life is the 
ethical self-understanding of the species, which is crucial for whether or not we may go on to 
see ourselves as beings committed to moral judgement and action. Where we lack compelling 
moral reasons, we have to let ourselves be guided by the signposts set up by the ethics of the 
species.’ (p. 71) This seems to be calling us to reflect on the most fundamental categories of 
the human experience so far - consciousness, subjectivity, reason, communication - and to 
consider whether or not we want to continue to be a species capable of flourishing, of choice 
and of forming the world. The choice is ours. 
 In a postscript to this second essay, Habermas addresses the possibility that designer 
humans might not regard themselves to be victims of interference. They might be unaware 
that they have been designed, or aware of the fact but not resentful of it. Nevertheless, 
Habermas believes that there are both ontological and pragmatic reasons for regarding the 
genetic designing of humans as interference. What it breaks is ‘the deontological shell which 
assures the individuality of the person, the uniqueness of the individual, and the 
irreplaceability of one’s subjectivity’. (p. 82) Once genetic profile becomes an object of 
choice (or potential yet omitted choice!), parents and others become responsible for it. 
Moreover, designing a high-quality baby might be quite difficult, and produce results no 
better than a birth in which there was no genetic intervention. Someone with an 
extraordinarily good memory and exceptionally high intelligence might, for instance, be 
unable to forget things that, for the sake of psychological health, need to be forgotten, and 
might become an object of envy or ridicule (or both) by peers to whom he finds it difficult to 
relate. 
 The third and final essay, ‘Faith and knowledge’, delivered in October 2001, 
addresses not bioethics but ‘secularization in our postsecular societies’. Habermas considers 
religious fundamentalism (which, unlike many Britons, he unashamedly identifies as a 
motivating force behind the 11 September terrorist attacks) to be the result of ‘an accelerated 
and radically uprooting modernization’. This itself is uncontroversial, but he proceeds to 
make some important connexions with his preceding material. As in issues of genetic 
engineering, it is the rapidity of change and of the increase in autonomy that can generate 
polarised responses. Cognitive dissonance can develop in a pluralist society between different 
consciousnesses, both religious and secular. This dissonance can occur when scientific 
method and perspective become too powerful in relation to other discourses. That is because a 
purely scientific ‘process’ of decision-making is opposed to a theistic understanding of 
creation and sustenance by a being who, because not subject to laws of nature, determines 
some aspects of existence but also bestows freedom. 
 Habermas offers one of the principal alternatives to postmodern agnosticism about 
the future of humanity, and for this reason alone is well worth reading. He moves quickly 
beyond linguistic analysis, rhetoric and other prolegomena to consider the fundamental and 
pressing questions that confront humanity. One question in my mind concerns what he might 
mean by an ‘ethics of the species’. Perhaps a cosmic existentialism reminiscent of Bergson’s, 
according to which unity and objectivity lie in the past, and no teleology exists to determine 
the future development of life? This would suggest, staying with Bergson, a morality and 
religion of movement, rather than a static one that tries to cope with, rather than to define, 
societal change. For his part, Habermas states in an endnote that an ‘ethics of the species’ 
would be deontological rather than the result of radical existential choice. Perhaps the 
autonomous legislator for humanity who takes duty seriously is, however, an existentialist as 
well. 
 One might develop this discussion further with insights of Hannah Arendt’s, whose 
concept of natality Habermas briefly discusses. Natality can be used to describe the new 
beginning that human life brings into the world by virtue of not being an object of production. 
It refers to creation from a contingent point within the created order that is defined by its own 
unique and inalienable set of conditions. Arendt also sees, like Habermas, the political 
importance of communicative action, and the co-originality of public and private autonomy. It 
is on the strength of these that societies are preserved or collapse, and it is these that give 
humanity responsibility for its future. Where do we want to go? 
